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Introduction
In the winter 2016 issue of The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Shawn 
Ritenour provides a thorough review of both volumes of my book Money, Banking, 
and the Business Cycle. I thank him for the compliments of my book that he pro-
vides. He also provides many criticisms. This article constitutes a response to some 
of the criticisms of the book in his review.
Before discussing the review further, let me provide a few details about the book 
to provide some context for the discussion of the review and my response to it. The 
book builds on the business cycle theory developed by Ludwig von Mises and Fried-
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rich Hayek—Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT). (Mises, 1966, pp. 550-571 and 
Hayek, 1935) In very brief terms, ABCT states that when government policy leads 
to accelerating increases in the supply of money and credit, it temporarily reduces 
interest rates and increases spending, revenues, and profits in an unexpected manner 
in the economy. This causes businesses to expand their activities and produce more 
in an attempt to take advantage of the unexpectedly profitable times. Moreover, busi-
nesses often borrow at the artificially low interest rates to expand their activities. The 
artificially low interest rates also lead to greater investment in industries farther back 
in the production chain. This is the case because the low rates increase the present 
values of long-term investments relative to short-term investments due to the com-
pounding effect of interest rates. This is the essence of the expansion phase of the 
business cycle according to ABCT.
The contraction ensues when government policy leads to decreases in the supply 
of money and credit or merely insufficient increases. At this point, spending, reve-
nues, and profits fall or fail to rise sufficiently, especially relative to expectations. 
In response, businesses cut back on their activities and lay off workers in order to 
prepare for the tougher than expected financial times. Interest rates also rise due to 
the decrease or insufficient increase in the supply of money and credit. The rising 
rates reduce long-term investment relative to short-term investment due to the com-
pounding effect of interest rates acting in reverse (i.e., higher discount rates reducing 
the present values of long-term investments relative to short-term investments). The 
result of all of this is that businesses must scrap many investments undertaken during 
the expansion. This is a major characteristic of the recession or depression.
For further context, here is a brief description of the four parts of the two-volume 
book that Ritenour reviews. Part one of volume one shows how manipulations of the 
supply of money and credit caused by government policy are the primary cause of 
the business cycle. Part one also defends ABCT from many criticisms, including the 
criticism that ABCT is not consistent with so-called rational expectations. Part two 
applies the theory to over 100 years of U.S. history to illustrate the explanatory pow-
er of the theory. Extensive amounts of data are used to show the explanatory power, 
including data for interest rates, the rate of profit in the economy, the money supply, 
the velocity of money, industrial production, gross domestic product (GDP)/gross 
national product (GNP), gross national revenue (a more comprehensive measure of 
spending and output than GDP/GNP), and more. The empirical discussion illustrates 
how the theory explains the Great Depression, the Great Recession, the recession of 
the early 1980s, and all episodes of the cycle in the U.S. since 1900. In addition, the 
book travels back to 18th century France and the Mississippi Bubble to demonstrate 
the explanatory power of ABCT.
Part one of volume two of the book critiques alternative theories of the cycle, in-
cluding John Maynard Keynes’s theories of depressions and fluctuations, Keynesian 
“sticky” price and wage theory, and real business cycle theory. Part two shows what a 
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free market in money and banking would look like, provides an outline to transition 
to a free market in money and banking, and provides a detailed explanation of why it 
would lead to greater stability in the monetary and banking system and raise the rate 
of economic progress in the economy.
Now that one has some background context, I will focus on responding to the review 
mentioned above. Shawn Ritenour compares my book to many other works in Austrian 
economics that cover the subjects I focus on in the book. I am familiar with most of 
the works to which he compares my book. Some, I am not. He highlights the fact that 
I could have done a better job comparing my work to Austrian works on the same sub-
jects. (Ritenour, 2016, pp. 390 and 394)1 I appreciate and accept this criticism.
I also accept his criticism of my statement that fiduciary media are backed by 
debt. I should have stated they are backed by loans made by banks. These loans, of 
course, lead to the existence of more debt in the economy. One can see this in the 
context of the discussion in which I stated they are backed by debt. (Simpson, 2014, 
vol. I, p. 21)2 Nonetheless, the criticism is a valid one.
While there are a few criticisms with which I agree, there are many with which I 
disagree. A discussion of the latter will help to advance ABCT and thus help econo-
mists better understand the business cycle and business cycle theory. In what follows, 
I discuss topics such as the sustainability of changes in time preference, the role of 
changes in prices in the business cycle, the nature of fraud, and the nature of value. I 
also discuss whether the structure of production can be measured using the average 
period of production. There are a few other topics raised in Ritenour’s review that I 
address as well.
Time Preference
The first issue in Ritenour’s review to be discussed is his claim regarding time pref-
erence. One criticism in the review is the claim that the book argues that changes in 
time preference will not be disruptive and cause the business cycle because changes 
in time preference occur gradually over the long-term. Ritenour says this misses the 
point. He claims that the crucial point is not that changes in time preference occur 
gradually over the long-term, but that changes in time preference are sustainable 
because they do not encourage investment inconsistent with the preferences of indi-
viduals in the economy. (p. 384) Clarification is needed on this issue.
First, while it is stated in the book that changes in time preference do not provide 
an explanation of the business cycle because time preference does not change quickly 
enough to cause the cycle (vol. I, pp. 95-96), it is also stressed that there are other in-
consistencies between the facts of the business cycle and changes in time preference. 
For example, if time preference decreased to cause interest rates to fall, which is how 
interest rates move during the expansion phase of the business cycle, the rate of profit 
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that businesses would earn on capital invested would fall as well, since there would 
be no overall change in spending and business revenues in the economy but there 
would be increased business costs due to the greater savings and resulting invest-
ment. (vol. I, pp. 95-97, 126-128, 153-156, 195-196, and 235-237) This is inconsistent 
with the facts of the business cycle, since, as is shown in the book, the rate of profit 
on capital invested rises during the expansion phase of the business cycle. (vol. I, pp. 
59-73, 126-128, 153-156, 195-196, and 235-237)
Second, while it is true that changes in time preference are, as Ritenour states, 
“by their nature sustainable” (p. 384), it is important to understand that the reason 
why they are sustainable is because they occur over the long-term. If time preference 
throughout the economy routinely went through radical changes in the short-term, the 
projects undertaken by investors based on these changes would not be sustainable. 
If, for instance, time preference dramatically decreased for eight years, this would 
create a dramatic increase in savings and decrease in interest rates. If businessmen 
invested more and lengthened the term of their investments, such a focus would not 
be sustainable if time preference radically increased for two years after this period. 
All of the sudden, businessmen would have to scrap investment projects and reduce 
the term of the investment projects they are focusing on due to the sudden lack of 
availability of credit. Then, if after this period time preference suddenly decreased 
for six years again, the sudden availability of credit would move investment in the 
opposite direction. I grant that businessmen would be more reluctant to take on long-
term projects after taking on such projects and having to scrap them with the previ-
ous changes in time preference. However, the longer that time preference decreases 
and the larger the decline in time preference is, the more likely businesses would be 
to react by investing more in total and in longer-term projects.
If time preference changed in this manner, it would create an environment in 
which much long-term investment would be unsustainable. In fact, there would be 
many similarities to the business cycle. For example, businesses that invested too 
heavily in long-term projects as time preference decreased would have to lay off 
workers as time preference increased, so unemployment would tend to increase for 
a short period. As investment shifted from long-term to short-term projects, workers 
could be hired to work on the short-term projects, however, such a shift can create 
temporary unemployment due to frictional and structural factors in the labor markets.
In effect, such radical changes in time preference would create a type of malin-
vestment. This would lead to losses (or, at least, reduced profits) on the part of some 
businesses during the period when time preference increases. Investment projects 
would have to be scrapped, assets and workers redeployed, and some capital lost 
altogether given that capital is heterogeneous and businesses incur costs to redeploy 
capital even if it can be used in other projects.
So, fortunately, changes in time preference tend to occur over the long term. If they 
did not, it would create much dislocation in the economy, make it harder to progress 
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forward economically, and create business-cycle like fluctuations. Changes in time 
preference are sustainable because they tend to occur over the long-term. The fact that 
radical changes in time preference do not generally occur over the short-term is an im-
portant point to recognize if one wants to understand why changes in time preference 
are sustainable and why they do not cause the business cycle. One cannot properly 
consider their sustainability without understanding that they occur over the long-term.
Lastly with regard to time preference, it is important to note that, even though 
what I say above is true, I am not denying that sometimes dramatic fluctuations in 
time preference do occur over the short-term. However, when they do, it is the event 
that causes the change in time preference that has the major effect on the economy, 
not the change in time preference itself. For example, if a country becomes involved 
in a major war, this would increase time preference since much more focus would be 
placed on the production of consumers’ goods (i.e., military hardware). The major 
factor influencing the economy, however, is not the change in time preference, but the 
war. People are merely responding with the higher time preference to this significant 
event that must be immediately addressed. People’s normal lives—including normal 
investment projects—are placed on hold in order to win the war. Two more examples 
pertaining to this discussion are presented in the book. (vol. II, pp. 136-137)
Inflation and the Equation of Exchange
Next, it is claimed in the review that the book adopts “a simple monetarist, quantity 
theory of money approach to inflation” by employing the price level equation P = D 
/ S (where P = the general price level, D = the monetary spending for goods, and S 
= the supply of goods). (p. 385) While this price-level equation is used in the book, 
this mischaracterizes the approach to inflation in the book. The price-level equation 
is used only to initiate the discussion of inflation in the book and demonstrate that in-
flation, properly understood, is not a rise in the general level of prices but an increase 
in the money supply at a rate more rapid than the increase in the supply of commod-
ity money. Monetarists, like most contemporary economists, believe the essence of 
inflation is rising prices, although monetarists are better on the source of the rising 
prices than most other economists. However, as is shown in the book, that leads to 
many false conclusions and much ignorance concerning the nature of inflation, the 
business cycle, and economic activity more generally. (vol. I, pp. 22-28)
Moreover, the approach to inflation in the book does not assume that increases in 
the money supply lead to proportional increases in prices, something that the basic 
form of the quantity theory of money assumes. (vol. I, pp. 43-46) It is extensively 
discussed in the book how changes in the money supply can also lead to changes in 
the demand for money (and thus the velocity of circulation of money). Changes in the 
money supply can affect the expectations individuals have about the value of money 
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and can thus cause them to increase or decrease their demand for money. This, in 
turn, can cause the percentage increase or decrease in prices to be far greater than the 
percentage increase or decrease in the money supply.
The approach to inflation in the book also takes into account the fact that new 
money does not lift all prices to the same extent or at the same time. It depends on 
where the new money is spent first in the economy. (vol. I, pp. 72-73) This, of course, 
is consistent with the Austrian approach to inflation. (for an example, see Mises, 
1966, pp. 412-413)
Based on the focus of inflation on increases in the money supply, many other 
effects of inflation, besides rising prices, are discussed in the book, including not 
only malinvestment, overconsumption, and the business cycle itself, but the with-
drawal-of-wealth effect, the negative effect of taxes on profits, the creation of greater 
uncertainty in the economy, capital decumulation, and more. (vol. II, pp. 226-231) 
Identifying the fundamental characteristic of inflation as an increase in the money 
supply, relative to how much a commodity money—free-market money—would in-
crease, and using this to demonstrate the myriad effects of inflation, goes far beyond 
a monetarist approach or a simple quantity theory of money approach to inflation. 
This treatment of inflation is consistent with Austrian economists’ treatment of infla-
tion. (for an example, see Rothbard, 2009, p. 989-994)
The review also criticizes the fact that the importance of the equation of exchange 
is highlighted in the book. The importance of this equation is highlighted because it 
focuses economists on two important variables: the money supply and the velocity of 
circulation of money. It can thus help economists understand the business cycle. (vol. 
I, p. 46) In response, it is stated in the review that, “because business cycles are the 
result of malinvestment which has to do with relative prices and interest rates and is 
not driven by changes in overall prices or spending, the equation of exchange tells us 
little to nothing about the business cycle.” (p. 386, emphasis in original) There are a 
few problems here.
First, nowhere in the book does it say that the business cycle is driven by overall 
prices. The equation of exchange is important because of its focus on velocity (i.e., 
the demand for money) and the money supply. These affect spending and thus affect 
profits and the rate of profit in the economy.
In addition, while it is true that business cycles result in malinvestment and that 
relative changes in prices and changes in interest rates play a role in this, this is a very 
narrow view of both the causes and the effects of the business cycle. It fails to account 
for what is driving interest rates and prices and it fails to account for other effects of the 
business cycle. It is changes in the supply of money and credit that drive interest rates 
and prices, but changes in the money supply drive spending, revenues, and profits as 
well. (vol. I, pp. 29-32, 59-73, 126-138, 152-165, 195-199, and 235-242) Profits change 
in both absolute and relative terms. For example, during the expansion phase not only 
does the overall rate of profit increase in the economy, but the rate of profit increases 
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in industries farther removed from final consumption relative to industries closer to 
final consumption.3 So, changes in the money supply drive interest rates, relative prices, 
overall profits, and relative profits, all of which result in malinvestment.
Moreover, the changes in these variables result in many other effects of the business 
cycle, including overconsumption, the negative effects of taxes on profits, the withdraw-
al-of-wealth effect, and more. These effects are not only explained by changes in the 
money supply, the supply of credit, relative prices, and interest rates, but by changes in 
overall profits and relative profits as well.4 One must incorporate the changes in spend-
ing and profits (both relative and absolute) to have a complete explanation of all the 
facts of the business cycle. Otherwise, one will leave some facts unexplained.
The benefit of the equation of exchange is that it focuses on two variables that af-
fect spending: money and velocity. As is stated in the book, it can therefore help one 
understand what affects these variables. Placing the focus on velocity is particularly 
important, since the effect of that variable on spending is often ignored. Velocity 
provides a measurement of the demand for money, since velocity moves inversely 
with the demand for money. Hence, anything that affects individuals’ demand for 
holding money moves velocity. This includes rapid changes in the supply of mon-
ey. (vol. I, pp. 27-28) This is important in explaining the business cycle, since the 
demand for money generally decreases during the expansion and increases during 
the contraction. (vol. I, pp. 129-130, 160-165, 198-199, and 240-242) These changes 
in money demand exacerbate the changes in spending and profits due to changes in 
the money supply. So here we have a focus on two variables that can be used to help 
explain changes in relative prices, interest rates, overall profits, relative profits, and 
everything that results from changes in these variables (malinvestment, etc.). To deny 
the importance of the equation of exchange, at a minimum, makes it more difficult to 
see the importance of money and velocity and thus makes it harder to see everything 
that results from changes in these variables.
Finally, it is important to note that even though the equation of exchange focuses 
on aggregate variables, it does not deny that economic activity takes place at the level 
of the individual. It is individuals obtaining additional loans and spending the pro-
ceeds, it is individuals changing their demand for money, it is individuals responding 
to changes in interest rates and the rate of profit, etc. Analysis of these phenomena 
is a separate task. Nonetheless, highlighting these two important variables and how 
they affect spending is a significant contribution of the equation of exchange to un-
derstanding the business cycle and economic activity more generally.
Prices vs. Spending
In the review, exception is taken to the claim made in the exposition of ABCT in the 
book that the focus should be on changes in spending in the economy as the cause 
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of the business cycle. In the review, it is emphasized that we should be focusing on 
prices. It states in the review, “business cycles are the result of malinvestment which 
has to do with relative prices . . . .” (p. 386) In connection with profitability, it is stated 
in the review that, “what matters for profitability is not the volume of spending or 
revenues per se, but the gap between the price of products and the sum of the prices 
of factors used to produce those products. This gap can continue to be positive even 
if the total quantity of spending falls.” (pp. 396-397, emphasis in original) Let us 
consider why the important variable is spending, not prices.
First, prices are not primaries. They are determined by supply and demand in 
the marketplace. Demand is determined by spending. For example, the greater the 
spending for a good, the greater the demand. Spending in the economy is determined 
by the supply of money. The important variable, in the context of the business cycle, 
driving prices is spending. This is true whether we are discussing an aggregate level 
of prices or the prices of individual goods. All of this is discussed in the book (vol. I, 
pp. 9, 22-25, 60-61, and 72-73)
Moreover, when businesses are considering whether to invest their focus is on 
profitability on the income statement. Profitability is determined by revenues and 
costs. Revenues and costs both result from spending. Revenues represent spending 
for the goods produced and sold by businesses. Costs are determined by the spend-
ing by businesses for factors of production. So, the focus of investors is on spending 
through profitability, revenues, and costs.
While it is true that revenues and costs represent, respectively, the sum of the pric-
es obtained for the individual units of products sold and the sum of the prices paid for 
individual units of factors of production, the focus of businesses when determining 
the profitability of an investment is primarily on revenues and costs, not prices. As 
long as the prices of the goods sold and factors purchased have a profitable relation-
ship to each other—and this occurs independently of the business cycle in order for 
industries and businesses to be viable in the long run—profitability will move with 
changes in spending. This is especially true given the historical nature of costs, but is 
true even if we ignore this aspect of costs.
Let me provide an example to address a specific scenario discussed in the review: 
prices remaining constant so that the gap between the prices of products sold and 
the prices of factors remains constant, while at the same time the money supply and 
spending fall. If revenue for a business is initially 100 and costs are initially 95 for 
profits of 5, if due to a decrease in the money supply spending falls by 10 percent and 
both revenues and costs for this business decrease by the same amount that spending 
in the economy in general falls, profits will decrease to 4.5 for this business (i.e., 90 
– 85.5). Here we see that profits decrease with a change in spending and no change in 
prices and thus no change in the gap between selling and buying prices.
Taking into account the historical nature of costs, costs will decrease less than 
revenues and profits will change even more than 10 percent. This occurs because, 
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while costs on account of variable inputs (such as materials and labor) will decrease 
along with revenue, costs on account of fixed inputs (such as plant and equipment) 
will remain constant if no fixed inputs are completely used up during the period un-
der consideration, no new fixed inputs are purchased, and straight-line depreciation 
is used. Assuming that variable costs and fixed costs are initially equal, this implies 
that, instead of a profit, the firm incurs a loss of 0.25 after spending decreases (i.e., 
90 – [42.75 + 47.5] = -0.25). Note that variable costs decrease here from 47.5 to 42.75 
and fixed costs remain constant at 47.5. So, profits not only decrease by more than 10 
percent but actually turn to losses. Again, all of this occurs with no change in prices 
and thus no change in the gap between selling and buying prices. Changes in profit 
in these examples occur due to changes in the number of units of the good sold. The 
same would be true, mutatis mutandis, with increases in spending. For the details 
of how this all occurs, see the relevant discussion in the book. (vol. I, pp. 33-34 and 
61-72)
Given the change in overall spending and the changes in the profitability of indi-
vidual industries and firms that will result, malinvestment can result with no changes 
in prices. Add to this the effects from changes in interest rates and the malinvestment 
will be that much worse. Even so, all of this can still occur with no change in the gap 
between selling and buying prices. The key is that one needs changes in spending and 
interest rates, not changes in prices (whether relative or otherwise), to get the business 
cycle. All of this is discussed in the book. (vol. I, pp. 71-72, 75-76, and 98) Of course, 
changes in relative prices do typically occur and provide additional forces driving the 
cycle. This is also discussed in the book. (vol. I, p. 72)
Keynesian Fallacies
It is claimed in the review that as long as prices are flexible in the downward direc-
tion, a recession will not occur. To quote from the review: “he [Simpson] . . . identifies 
the cause of recession as ‘a decline, less rapid increase, or less rapid acceleration in 
spending’ (II. p. 17). This is not correct, as long as prices are flexible downward . . . 
.” (p. 392) In making this statement, the Keynesian fallacy that recessions are caused 
by “sticky” prices and wages is embraced in the review.
It is shown in the book that even if prices and wages fully adjust to changes in 
aggregate demand or spending, both expansions and recessions will still occur. This 
is due in part, as discussed above, to the amplified changes in the rate of profit caused 
by the historical nature of costs. This causes the rate of profit to move more than pric-
es. Moreover, the cycle occurs because prices adjusting fully does not eliminate the 
incentive to expand or contract provided by changes in interest rates and the ability 
to pay off debt. For example, focusing on a recession, since this is the episode spe-
cifically referred to in the review, when interest rates rise (as they generally do in a 
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contraction), this raises the cost of borrowing (in real terms), which makes it harder to 
maintain one’s business activity at its current level. Also, decreased revenues during 
the contraction make debts taken on in the past, when spending and revenue were 
higher, harder to pay off because there is less revenue available to make one’s debt 
payments. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for expansions. This is all discussed in 
the book. (vol. I, pp. 54, 70-71, 126-128, 153-156, 195-196, and 235-237)
Moreover, it is claimed in the review that “he [Simpson] mistakenly indicates that 
Keynes and the Keynesians’ solution for recession is to boost consumption spending 
. . . .” (p 386) This is no mistake. It is common knowledge that Keynes and Keynes-
ians prefer consumption as the solution to recessions (and to promote alleged eco-
nomic health, in general). Their advocacy of consumption is seen in their desire for 
increased government spending to “stimulate” the economy during a recession. As 
is shown in the book, the government is a giant consumer. (vol. I, pp. 40-42) Their 
preference for consumption is also seen in the “Keynesian Multiplier.” Through the 
use of this “multiplier,” they discourage saving because saving is seen as a “leakage” 
from the economy. They encourage consumption spending because, according to the 
“Keynesian Multiplier,” consumption leads to even greater increases in spending, 
relative to the initial increase in spending, through the so-called marginal propensi-
ty to consume. Keynes himself promoted consumption as the best means to lift an 
economy out of a depression. He considered this the best way because, according to 
Keynes, it does not put downward pressure on the marginal efficiency of capital (i.e., 
the rate of profit on new investment), as additional investment spending allegedly 
does. The book provides ample evidence of Keynes’s preference for consumption 
over saving and investment through extensive quotations of Keynes. It also provides 
a thorough refutation of both the “Keynesian multiplier” and Keynes’s ideas related 
to the business cycle. (vol. I, pp. 46-56 and vol. II, pp. 17-43)
The Average Period of Production
The review also raises an objection to the use in the book of the average period of 
production to represent the structure of production. Austrian economists have gener-
ally rejected the use of the average period of production because a satisfactory meth-
od of measuring it has not been provided. However, George Reisman has supplied us 
with a means of measuring the average period of production. This makes it possible 
to use it to assess the capital intensiveness of the structure of production. Reisman 
states that “[o]ne can express the concept of the average period of production or the 
length of the structure of production in terms of how many years must elapse before 
some given percentage of the capital goods and labor in existence in a base year will 
have ended up directly or indirectly serving in the production of consumers’ goods.” 
(Reisman, 1996, p. 822)
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To illustrate how to measure the average period of production, he uses an ex-
ample with a simplified economy in which the capital goods and consumers’ goods 
available at the beginning of the year are consumed entirely in that year and each 
stage of production is equal to one year in length. In addition, the goods produced in 
the economy all require the same proportions of capital goods and labor to produce 
them. Given these assumptions, and the further assumptions that the capital goods 
and labor are used each year to exactly replace the capital goods consumed each year 
and produce equal values of consumers’ goods and capital goods (i.e., production 
consists of 50 percent capital goods and 50 percent consumers’ goods), the average 
period of production for 90 percent of the capital goods available in a base year to 
directly or indirectly serve in the production of consumers’ goods is between three 
and four years. This is the case because 50 percent of the capital goods available in 
the base year (call it Year 1) directly serve in the production of the consumers’ goods 
produced in that year. In addition, 25 percent of the capital goods available in Year 
1 produced the half of the capital goods available in Year 2 that produced the con-
sumers’ goods of that year. Continuing with the example, 12.5 percent of the capital 
goods available in Year 1 produced 25 percent of the capital goods in Year 2, which, 
in turn, were used to produce the half of the capital goods that produced the consum-
ers’ goods for Year 3. This means, in three years, 87.5 percent of the capital goods 
and labor available in Year 1 were used directly or indirectly to produce consumers’ 
goods. Following the same procedure, 6.25 percent of the capital goods available in 
Year 1 indirectly produced the consumers’ goods available in Year 4. Hence, in four 
years 93.75 percent of the capital goods and labor available in Year 1 directly or in-
directly served to produce consumers’ goods. So, the average period of production or 
the length of the structure of production is between three and four years.
With a more capital-intensive economy, the average period of production or the 
length of the structure of production increases. To represent a more capital-intensive 
economy, Reisman uses an example in which the capital goods and labor existing at 
the beginning of each year are used to produce a value of capital goods each year that 
is 50 percent greater than the value of consumers’ goods. Hence, the value of what is 
produced comprises 60 percent capital goods and 40 percent consumers’ goods each 
year. In this case, the average period of production is lengthened to between four and 
five years. (Reisman, 1996, pp. 820-824)
The above procedure applies under some very limiting simplifying assumptions. 
As a result, Reisman also provides an alternative method for measuring the average 
period of production under more realistic conditions. The description of the alter-
native method is too lengthy for this paper. However, one gets an idea of how the 
average period of production or structure of production can be measured from the 
simplified example. Here I merely direct the reader to the relevant discussion on the 
alternative method. (Reisman, 1996, pp. 639-641, 647, and 843-854)
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Value
Issue is also taken in the review with the claim in the book that gold has objective, 
not subjective, value. It is stated in the review that the discussion in the book on this 
topic is imprecise, misleading, and confusing. (p. 397) No mention of why is provid-
ed. Nonetheless, Ritenour and I have a fundamental disagreement on the nature of 
value because he believes value is subjective, not objective. (p. 396) This is probably 
the reason for the criticisms in the review.
It is discussed in brief terms at a couple of points in the book why gold money 
has objective value. (vol. II, pp. 159-160 and 232-233) Why values, in general, are 
objective and not subjective can only be understood as an implication of the discus-
sion of gold as objectively valuable. Discussing the objectivity of value would have 
taken the book away from its central purpose: to understand the causes and cures of 
the business cycle. So, I will elaborate here in brief terms why values are objective.
There are three theories of value: the subjective, intrinsic, and objective. The sub-
jective theory of value says that the value of something is determined by the sub-
ject—the person doing the valuing—independently of the object being evaluated. For 
example, according to the subjective theory of value, an object is of value merely 
because someone feels it is of value or wants it to be of value. Based on this theory, if 
a person feels that snorting cocaine is of value, then it is of value. The effect that the 
object has on a person’s life and well-being does not matter.
Obviously, something is wrong here. Just because someone might feel something 
is beneficial to his life will not make that thing of value if, in fact, the object—the 
item being evaluated—is destructive to his life. One cannot wish reality into exis-
tence. So, cocaine is not a value even if one feels it is. It is not of value because of the 
effects it has on human life, which we can identify through an assessment of the facts 
based on a rational standard, including the requirements of human life.
Nothing changes if we substitute a group for the individual. That is, social subjec-
tivism is false as well. For example, a group of people—even an entire nation—may 
want socialism to be of value to human beings. However, their wishing does not 
change the nature of socialism. Regardless of how many people think socialism is 
good, it is destructive to human life, and we can identify why it is destructive through 
a logical analysis of the facts pertaining to socialism and the nature of human life.5
The intrinsic theory of value says that the value of something is determined by the 
object being evaluated independently of the person doing the valuing. This means, 
for example, that an object is of value by the mere fact of its existence. One variant 
of this theory—the labor theory of value—says the value of a good is determined by 
the amount of labor required to produce it. Based on this theory, square wheels are as 
valuable as round wheels if the labor required to produce them is the same. As with 
the subjective theory of value, this theory ignores the effects of the object being eval-
uated on the valuer. It ignores the relationship between the object being evaluated and 
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the person performing the evaluation. Using rational standards, including the benefit 
of means of transportation to human life and the requirements of those means of 
transportation, we can determine that square wheels have no value and round wheels 
have substantial value.
So, value is not determined by the person doing the valuing independently of the 
object being evaluated and it is not determined by the object being evaluated inde-
pendently of the person doing the valuing. Value is determined by an assessment of 
the relationship of the object being evaluated to the person doing the evaluating. That 
is, value is objective. It is important to understand here that the relationship of the 
object to the subject must be rationally assessed. It is also important to understand 
that a rational evaluation does not consist of, “I feel this object is of value.” One has 
to look at the nature of the object being evaluated and determine whether the effect 
it has on the person doing the evaluating is beneficial or harmful. Furthermore, what 
is beneficial and harmful must be determined based on rational standards. What is 
beneficial and harmful to human life is not arbitrary. Human life has a certain nature 
and thus has certain requirements. To determine objectively whether something is of 
value one must evaluate the relationship of the subject to the object based on a logical 
analysis of the facts. This is what it means to use rational standards.
This discussion provides an indication of the objective nature of values. The na-
ture of value is an enormous subject and cannot be discussed in detail in this paper. 
There are many aspects of this subject to understand. For instance, why are both 
universal and optional values objective (for example, both food and specific types 
of food, such as liver and onions, are objectively of value)? What, specifically, does 
objective thinking consist of? What is the status of pseudo-values (what Carl Menger 
called imaginary goods [Menger, 1994 [1871], pp. 53-54])? Why are prices objective 
measures of value? All of these questions, and many, many more, cannot be answered 
here. One must turn to other works for a more detailed exposition of the objective 
nature of values. (such as Peikoff, 1991, pp. 241-249 and Rand, 1967, pp. 21-28)
Miscellanous Issues
There are a few other issues in the review of Money, Banking, and the Business Cycle 
worth addressing. First, exception is taken in the review to the second-best policy 
discussed in the book whereby, in response to the cycle, the government makes sure 
the money supply does not shrink. In the review it states, “It is especially hard to 
make sense of his [Simpson’s] call to not let the money supply fall, as if it is the job 
of the central bank to maintain an optimal . . . money supply.” (p. 390) However, it 
is easy to make sense of this policy suggestion given that it is a second-best solution. 
The discussion in the book on this topic is set within the context of the best policy—
achieving a laissez-faire capitalist society in the U.S.—not being a possibility, given 
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the U.S. government’s desire today to interfere in the economy. Given this context, 
what is the best policy we could expect the U.S. government to engage in? That policy 
is to maintain the money supply and deregulate the economy. (vol. I, pp. 136-137) It 
is as if the desire being expressed in the review is to have the best solution not only as 
the first option, but as the second-best option as well. That, certainly, does not make 
any sense.
It is also claimed in the review that there is a contradiction in the book regarding 
protecting the right of banks to engage in fractional-reserve banking. It is claimed in 
the review, in essence, that the viewpoint expressed in the book is that fractional-re-
serve banking is both fraudulent and not fraudulent. (p. 395) This is claimed in the 
review because it is stated in the book that fractional-reserve banking is not inherently 
fraudulent. It can be engaged in openly, with full knowledge of all the parties involved. 
(vol. II, pp. 126-130) However, a quotation from the book is also provided in the review 
that states that banking is one of the easiest industries to commit fraud in because it is 
easy for bankers to secretly lend reserves they are contractually obligated to keep on 
hand. If the next sentence from the book had also been quoted, after the sentence from 
the book that was quoted in the review, one would see that it is also stated in the book 
that, “If governments had protected individual rights (and in many cases not been an 
accomplice in the fraud), this practice would have been stopped . . . .” (vol. II, p. 216) 
Just because it may be easy to commit fraud in an industry does not mean that every-
one in the industry is engaging in fraud. Wanting to impose 100-percent reserves on 
the banking industry because there is the potential for bankers to commit fraud is, in 
essence, the same argument that statists use to justify regulation. They claim we must 
regulate to, for instance, prevent people from harming others by building unsafe prod-
ucts. Statists also seek to outlaw the ownership of guns because guns could potentially 
be used to commit murder. This argument, whether with regard to banking or regula-
tion in general, assumes people are guilty until proven innocent and is a slippery slope 
toward a police state. To protect rights, one must have evidence that specific individuals 
are engaging in fraud before preventing them from engaging in an activity. The mere 
potential of fraud is not an appropriate justification to outlaw the activity.
It is also claimed in the review that I contradict my argument that fractional-re-
serve banking is not inherently fraudulent when I state that it is an attempt to cheat 
reality because it is an attempt by people to have their money and lend it at the same 
time. While the review claims that cheating reality “could allude to philosophical 
inconsistency,” it also states that “cheating implies fraud.” (pp. 395-396) But the term 
“cheating reality” is obviously being used metaphorically in the context in which it 
is used in the book. It means that one is attempting to get away with a contradiction. 
To commit fraud, one must not attempt to “cheat reality.” One must cheat another 
person. The review equivocates between the metaphorical meaning of “cheat” and 
the literal meaning. There is no contradiction in the two claims made in the book that 
the review refers to here.
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In addition, it is stated in the review that a naïve suggestion is made in the book 
in the call for restrictions to be included in the U.S. Constitution on what the govern-
ment can do in connection with the monetary and banking system. It is claimed this 
is naïve because the U.S. Constitution does not currently provide the U.S. Congress 
with the power to charter banks, but this has not stopped it from chartering banks 
and interfering in the monetary and banking system in other ways. (p. 394) However, 
there is a major difference between placing explicit restrictions in the Constitution on 
what the U.S. government can do and the Constitution remaining silent on what the 
U.S. government can do. If the U.S. Constitution remains silent in a particular area, 
statists can use provisions in the Constitution that endorse government interference 
more generally, such as the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 (which gives 
the government the power to regulate commerce), to justify government interference 
in that area. In the area of money and banking, unfortunately, the U.S. Constitution 
is not silent. The Coinage Clause, also in Article I, Section 8, gives the government 
the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof. Explicitly restricting what 
the U.S. government can do with regard to money and banking (and, as a part of this, 
repealing provisions of the Constitution that allow the U.S. government to interfere in 
the monetary and banking system, such as the Coinage Clause) would provide much 
stronger protection of a free market in the monetary and banking system in the U.S. 
There is nothing naïve about that.
Finally, an objection is raised in the review to the claim in the book that a decrease 
in the money supply caused the downturn in 1938 in the U.S. It is stated in the review 
that, “His [Simpson’s] only stumble is his unfortunate buying into the monetarist 
notion that a decrease in the money supply in 1936-1937 led to the recession in 1938 
. . . .” (p. 391) This is a bizarre claim considering the fact that one of the main claims 
throughout the book is that all recessions and depressions are due to manipulations 
of the supply of money. It is stated in the book that expansions are caused by accel-
erating increases in the supply of money and credit and this leads to recessions and 
depressions when the supply of money and credit are either not increased at a great 
enough rate or they are actually decreased. In every empirical chapter pertaining to 
the U.S., a graph of the changes in the money supply is included in the section on the 
causes of the cycle. There was no objection in the review to this claim in connection 
with all the other recessions and depressions discussed in the book. How is the con-
traction that occurred in 1938 fundamentally different than any of the other contrac-
tions in the U.S. from 1900 to 2010? I will grant that there were various regulations 
imposed by the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt that made this 
downturn worse than it otherwise would have been (as it is also argued in the case 
of the Great Depression).6 However, the fundamental cause, as in all recessions and 
depressions, was a change in the money supply caused by government policy.
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Conclusion
In the review of Money, Banking, and the Business Cycle analyzed in this paper, 
there are many errors and a number of inaccurate claims made about the content of 
the book. For example, the discussion in the book on time preference and its rela-
tion to the business cycle is mischaracterized. The view of inflation in the book is 
mischaracterized and there is a failure on the part of the reviewer to understand the 
significance and importance of the equation of exchange. A lack of understanding of 
the relationship between spending and prices, especially their causal roles in the busi-
ness cycle, is also demonstrated. In addition, a Keynesian fallacy is embraced in the 
review. There is a failure to understand many of the arguments made in the book. It 
is important to make sure one understands the arguments in a book one is reviewing 
before one writes the review. It is also important to make sure one accurately deals 
with those arguments in one’s review of the book. This did not occur in this case.
There are many other errors in the review. The analysis here and in an earlier pa-
per (Simpson, 2017) of the errors in the review provide a good understanding of the 
errors in the review and enable the reader to learn a great deal from those errors.7 I 
encourage people not to ignore or dismiss the arguments in the book simply because 
they might be different from the arguments that have been made by other economists. 
If one does not merely dismiss the arguments because they are different, one will 
see that the ideas in the book improve our understanding of the business cycle and 
economics more generally.
NOTES
1  For subsequent references to Ritenour’s review, I will only refer to the page number.
2  For subsequent references to my book, I will only refer to the volume and page number.
3  For an indication of this relative effect, see vol. I, pp. 115-120, 122-126, 143-146, 148-152, 188-190, 
192-195, and 221-234.
4  For the link between the inflation of the money supply and these effects, see vol. II, pp. 226-231.
5  On the destructive nature of socialism, see Simpson, 2005, pp. 5-23.
6  On some of the government interference during the Great Depression, see vol. I, pp. 202-218.
7  The earlier paper analyzes errors separate from the errors analyzed in this paper.
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